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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of 
Virginia Joanie Goodman, a person 
under eighteen years of age. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF 
The plaintiff-respondent petitions this Honorable 
Court for rehearing in the above entitled case pursuant 
to Rule 76(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for 
the following reasons: 
1. In its opinion the Court did not consider the 
1969 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 32-5-15 (1953), 
which was in effect at the time of appellant's arrest. 
2. In its opinion the Court did not consider the 
material point that an arrest was being effected when 
appellant interfered with the police officer. 
3. Under an interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-166 (1953), every time a traffic citation is issued, 
Case No. 
13822 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
the driver is under arrest in the technical sense and any 
interference is in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 
(Supp. 1973). 
Respectfully submitted, .•/., 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I. 
THE PETITION IS PROPERLY BEFORE 
THE COURT UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE. 
This petition is not filed for purposes of rearguing 
matters originally presented. It is intended to bring to 
the Court's attention an error in its conclusions and a 
failure to duly consider a material point in the case. This 
is within the scope of criteria established by this Court 
for the granting of rehearings in Venard v. Old Hickory, 
4 Utah 67, 7 Pac. 408 (1885). 
POINT II. 
IN ITS OPINION THE COURT DID NOT 
CONSIDER THE 1969 AMENDMENT TO 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-5-15, WHICH 
WAS IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF AP-
PELLANT'S ARREST. 
In its opinion in State of Utah, in the interest of 
Virginia Joanie Goodman, No. 13822, dated February 4, 
1975, the Court stated: 
"Section 32-7-15, U. C. A. 1953, is one of the 
statutes alleged to have been violated by Joanie. 
That statute is in the following language: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Alcoholic beverages shall not be given, sold 
or otherwise supplied to any person under the 
age of twenty-one years, but this shall not apply 
to the supplying of liquor to such person for 
medicinal purposes only by the parent or guar-
dian of such person or to the administering of 
liquor to such person by a physician in accord-
ance with the provisions of this act. 
Evidence of intoxication does not show nor 
intend to show a violation of the statute above 
set forth. It is quite evident from a reading of 
the statute that it deals with an entirely differ-
ent subject matter. The court nevertheless found 
Joanie guilty of violating that provision. The 
court was in error in that finding." 
The history of the above quoted version of Section 
32-7-15 shows that it was enacted by the Legislature of 
the State of Utah in Chapter 43, § 128, Laws of Utah 
1935, passed March 14, 1935, and in effect March 25, 
1935. The section was amended by Chapter 63, § 1, Laws 
of Utah 1967, and amended by Chapter 83, § 25, Laws 
of Utah 1969. The 1969 amendment was passed Febru-
ary 28, 1969, and went in effect May 13, 1969. 
The 1969 amended version of Section 32-7-15 was in 
effect when appellant was arrested on November 29,1973, 
for the illegal use of an alcoholic beverage. This version 
of Section 32-7-15 is found in the 1973 Pocket Supple-
ment, Volume 9, Utah Code Annotated and states: 
"No person shall sell or supply alcoholic 
beverages to any minor, nor shall any minor 
purchase, consume or possess any alcoholic bev-
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erage, but this shall not apply to the supplying 
of liquor to such person for medicinal purposes 
only by the parent or guardian of such person 
or to the administering of liquor to such person 
by a physician in accordance with the provisions 
of this act." 
Evidence of intoxication would show a violation of the 
1969 amended version of Section 32-7-15, since the stat-
ute prohibited any minor from consuming alcoholic bev-
erages. 
POINT III. 
IN ITS OPINION THE COURT DID NOT 
CONSIDER THE MATERIAL POINT THAT 
AN ARREST WAS BEING EFFECTED 
WHEN APPELLANT INTERFERED WITH 
THE POLICE OFFICER. 
In its opinion, dated February 4, 1975, the Court 
said: 
"Even though Joanie interrupted the officer 
in his preparation of a citation by entering into 
a conversation with him and by calling him in-
appropriate names, this is insufficient to show 
that Joanie intentionally interfered with the offi-
cer. The record does not clearly show that the 
officer was engaged in making an arrest at the 
time. . . ." 
The record clearly shows in several places that the 
driver of the vehiclej, Linda Lehi, was being arrested when 
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the appellant interfered with the police officer. The fol-
lowing dialogue took place at the trial between the arrest-
ing officer and the county attorney, Mr. Redd (T. 9): 
"Q. And you say you did place her under arrest 
for interfering with an officer, and what did you 
do with her? 
A. She stated that she would not get in the 
car, and at this point Ernest Casey stepped be-
tween us and put his fists up towards me and 
that's when I forcefully arrested him and put 
him in the car. 
Q. Now at this point were you seeking to ar-
rest or take into detention Linda Lehi, for her 
offense? 
A. Yes, due to her driving pattern that I had 
observed, also the odor of an alcoholic beverage 
from her as she sat in the car. I then placed 
her under arrest for driving under the influence 
of alcohol." 
When defense counsel, Mr. Swenson, was cross-ex-
amining Officer Palmer, the following dialogue occurred 
(T. 16): 
"Q. 0. K. While Joanie and the other person 
were across the highway from your car, did you 
notv in fact, inform Linda Lehi that she was un-
der arrest? 
A. Either before they left to go over there or 
while they were over there, yes." 
Additional evidence that an arrest was being effected 
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is found in the re-direct examination of Officer Palmer 
by the county attorney (T. 21): 
"Q. Now, from the time that you had Linda 
Lehi in your car, until you arrested Joanie Good-
man, were you in the process of arresting Linda 
Lehi or processing her arrest? 
A. Yes, I was." 
POINT IV. 
UNDER AN INTERPRETATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 41-6-166 (1953), EVERY TIME 
A TRAFFICS CITATION IS ISSUED, THE 
DRIVER IS UNDER ARREST IN THE 
TECHNICAL SENSE, AND ANY INTER-
FERENCE IS IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-8-305 (SUPP. 1973). 
An arrest is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-1 
(1953), as "the taking of a person into custody in a case 
and in the manner authorized by law." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-13-2 (1953), defines how an arrest is made as fol-
lows: 
"An arrest is made by an actual restraint 
of the person of the defendant or by has admis-
sion to the custody of an officer. The defendant 
must not be subjected to any more restraint 
than is necessary for his arrest and detention." 
The California arrest statute contains almost identi-
cal language and based on this, the California Supreme 
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Court has held that every time a traffic sitation is issued, 
the driver is under arrest in the technical sense. In People 
v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 101 Cal. Rptr. 
8379 496 P. 2d 1205 (1972), the Court said: 
"The detention which results (during the 
citation process) is ordinarily brief, and the con-
ditions of restraint are minimal. Nevertheless 
the violator is, during the period immediately 
preceding his execution of the promise to appear 
under arrest. Some courts have been reluctant 
to use the term arrest to describe the status 
of the traffic violator on the public street waiting 
for the officer to write out the citation. The Ve-
cile Code, however, refers to the person awaiting 
citation as the 'arrested person.9 Viewing the 
situation functionally, the violator is being de-
tained against his will by a police officer, for the 
purpose of obtaining lias appearance in connec-
tion with a forthcoming prosecution. The vio-
lator is not free to depart until he has satisfac-
torily identified himself and has signed the writ-
ten promise to appear." 496 P. 2d at 1215. (Em-
phasis added.) 
Although no case law in Utah could be located on 
this specific point, it appears that the Utah Legislature 
intended the same results as pronounced by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-166 (1958), 
governs when a violator of the Motor Vehicles Act must 
be brought before a magistrate and it refers to the vio-
lator as the arrested person, as does the California Ve-
hicle Code. Section 41-6-166 states: 
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"Whenever any person is arrested for any 
violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor, 
the arrested person shall be immediately taken 
before a magistrate within the county in which 
the offence charged is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and who has jurisdiction of such offense 
and is nearest of most accessible with reference 
to the place where said arrest is made, in any 
of the following cases: 
(1) When a person arrested demands an 
immediate apperance before a magistrate. 
(2) When the person is arrested upon a 
charge of driving while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs. 
(3) When the person is arrested upon a 
charge of failure to stop in the event of an acci-
dent causing death, personal injuries, or damage 
to property. 
(4) In any other event when the person 
arrested refuses to give his written promise to 
appear in court as hereinafter provided, or when 
in the discretion of the arresting officer, a writ-
ten promise to appear is insufficient." 
The statute indicates that a person who violates the 
Motor Vehicle Code shall be arrested, but need not be 
detained in most cases if he gives his written promise 
to appear in court. For other jurisdictions that have 
adopted this definition of arrest see State v. Vaughn, 12 
Ariz. App. 442, 471 P. 2d 744 (1970); Williams v. State, 
Ind. App., 299 N. E. 2d 882 (1973); People v. Ricketson, 
129 IU. App. 2d 365, 264 N. E. 2d 220 (1970). 
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Appellant was arrested for violating Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-305 (Supp. 1973), which provides as follows: 
"A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
when he intentionally interferes with a person 
recognized to be a law enforcement officer seek-
ing to effect an arrest or detention of himself 
or another regardless of whether there is a legal 
basis for the arrest." 
The record clearly shows that the appellant inter-
fered with the officer when he was attempting to issue 
the citation to Linda Lehi for no driver's license (T. 5, 
6) and after he decided to place Linda under arrest for 
driving under the influence of alcohol (T. 9). There-
fore, from the time that Officer Palmer stopped the ve-
hicle and determined that the driver was in violation of 
the Motor Vehicles Act^  an arrest was technically being 
effected and when the officer determined that the driver 
was under the influence of alcohol he then placed her 
under arrest, in the traditional sense of the term. Any 
interference by the appellant from the point the officer 
decided to issue a citation is a violation of Section 76-
8-305. 
CONCLUSION 
The 1969 amended version of Utah Code Ann. § 
32-7-15 which forbids minors to consume alcoholic bever-
ages was in effect when appellant was arrested and the 
evidence from the record clearly indicates that appellant 
violated that statute. There is also testimony from the 
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record that an arrest was being effected when appellant 
interfered with the arresting police officer. In addition, 
appellant violated Section 76-8-305, supra, based on the 
fact that she interfered with the issuance of a traffic 
citation which may be considered an arrest under an 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-166 (1953). 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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